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1 RESPONSE TO PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Jurisdiction lies in this Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j). This is an appeal from an order entered by Judge David S. 
Young of the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, dismissing 
the Amended Complaint of the Plaintiffs, owners of Foothill 
Federated Corporation (hereinafter "Owners") as to the Defendants 
State of Utah and Utah Department of Financial Institution 
(hereinafter "DFI" or "the State"). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. S 7-2-15(1)(d) 
(1) The following obligations, expenses, and 
claims have the following priority: 
(d) fourth, claims of depositors, other than 
those of controlling persons, as defined in 
Section 7-8a-9. Any federal deposit insurance 
agency or other deposit insurer is subrogated 
to all rights of the depositors against the 
institution, its officers and directors, and 
its control persons as defined in Section 7-1-
103 to the extent of all payments made for the 
benefit of the depositors. "Payments," as 
used in this subsection, includes arrangements 
by a federal deposit insurance agency for the 
assumption or payment of the deposit 
liabilities by another institution whose 
deposits are insured by a federal deposit 
insurance agency. The right of any agency of 
the United States insuring deposits or savings 
obligations to be subrogated to the rights of 
depositors upon payment of their claims may 
not be less extensive than the law of the 
United States provides with respect to 
subrogation to the rights of depositors in 
national banks. For the purposes of this 
section, a contractual commitment to advance 
funds, including a standby letter of credit, 
may not be considered a deposit liability of 
the institution; 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs were the owners of Foothill Financial 
Corporation. Amended Complaint at page 2, para. 7-8. 
2. Foothill Financial Corporation was seized on April 4, 1987 
by DFI and virtually all of its assets were acquired by Zions First 
National Bank. Amended Complaint at page 4, para. 18. 
3. As part of this transaction, plaintiffs agreed to 
indemnify Zions First National Bank against certain potential 
losses. Amended Complaint at page 5, para. 19. 
4. Plaintiffs second claim for relief makes the claim that 
the transaction and indemnification mentioned above made the 
plaintiffs deposit insurers and therefore entitled to recovery as 
such from the State and DFI. Amended Complaint at page 6, para. 
25-27. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The plaintiffs, in their petition for rehearing, ask this 
Court to delete one sentence from this Court's decision in this 
matter on the basis that the sentence in question is dictum. 
The sentence is not dictum, but an important part of this 
Court's decision affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' claim for 
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statutory entitlement. 
That the challenged sentence is part of a second reason given 
by the Court for dismissing a certain cause of action does not make 
it dictum. This Court properly looked to the merits of the 
plaintiffs' statutory entitlement claim and ruled against the 
plaintiffs on the merits. 
The question of whether or not the owners of a thrift who gave 
a guarantee to indemnify the insured institution that acquired 
their thrift are deposit insurers was properly before the Court. 
The Court correctly held that the plaintiffs were not deposit 
insurers. 
The powers that the federal Congress may have given to the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. are immaterial to the question 
under the laws of the State of Utah as to whether or not the owners 
of a thrift are insurers of the deposits in that thrift under state 
law. Special provisions of state law that pertain solely to 
federal deposit insurance agencies are also immaterial. 
ARGUMENT 
In their Petition for Rehearing, Plaintiffs seek the deletion 
of a single sentence which is alleged by them to be merely dictum. 
This is not correct. The sentence that offends the plaintiffs is 
an integral part of this Court's holding in this matter. 
Plaintiff's second claim for relief was one of statutory 
entitlement. Plaintiff's/ as owners of Foothill Financial 
Corporation, gave Zion's First National Bank a guarantee that they 
would indemnify Zion's for any losses it might incur in taking over 
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the majority of the assets of Foothill Financial Corporation. 
Plaintiffs' allege that this agreement made the plaintiffs 
deposit insurers, and that therefore the plaintiffs have a claim 
for statutory entitlement based on Utah Code Ann. $ 7-8a-8, which 
sets the amount of the guaranty of depositors' funds. 
In rejecting this claim, this Court set forth two reasons why 
the plaintiffs' claim must fail. The first reason was that the 
plaintiffs sought to bring the action against the State and DFI as 
alter egos of the Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation (ILGC). 
This Court held that such a statutory entitlement claim should have 
been made directly against the State and could not rest on the 
alter ego theory. Prows v. State of Utah 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 24 
(Utah 1991). 
The second reason for affirming the dismissal of the 
plaintiffs' statutory entitlement claim was: 
Second, even if it was made directly against 
the State, plaintiffs do not have a valid 
statutory entitlement claim. Section 7-8a-8 
guarantees depositors' accounts, not the 
reimbursement of thrift institution owners, 
in their brief to this court, plaintiffs claim 
they may recover under section 7-2-15(1)(d), 
which provides, "Any federal deposit insurance 
agency or other deposit insurer is subrogated 
to all rights of the depositors to the extent 
of all payments made for the benefit of the 
depositors. ..." Plaintiffs were not a 
federal deposit insurance agency or other 
deposit insurer, however, and cannot rely on 
section 7-8-2-15(1)(d) to subrogate themselves 
to the rights of the depositors. 
Prows, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. The last sentence of this 
quoted paragraph is the one that the plaintiffs claim is 
unnecessary dictum. Far from being dictum, the offending passage 
is an integral part of the ruling on the merits in this action. It 
restates what the Court said in the first two sentences of the 
paragraph; that the plaintiffs do not have a valid claim for 
statutory entitlement under Utah Code Ann. §7-8a-8. 
The question of whether or not the plaintiffs, as thrift 
owners, could state a valid cause of action for statutory 
entitlement pursuant to this statute was properly before this 
Court. This was one of the plaintiffs' three claims for relief and 
was properly addressed by the Court. While this Court may have 
found other fatal defects with the plaintiffs pleadings that would 
justify affirming the lower court's dismissal of this cause of 
action; it cannot be said that this Court's explanation of the 
reasons for dismissing a third of the plaintiffs' amended complaint 
are merely dicta. 
Plaintiffs claim that this passage "substantially prejudices 
Plaintiffs' claim in the Utah Industrial Loan Guaranty Corporation 
("ILGC") liquidation proceeding now pending in Utah Third District 
Court." Appellants' Petition for Re-Hearing at page 1. 
To remove the one sentence in question would not alter this 
reality. This Court held that the section under which plaintiffs 
seek payment "guarantees depositors' accounts, not the 
reimbursement of thrift institution owners." Prows, 162 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 24. To obtain the result they seek, plaintiffs would have 
to ask this Court to strike its second grounds for dismissal of the 
statutory entitlement claim in its entirety. 
While it is true that the passage in question is part of the 
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second reason presented by the Court for the dismissal of the 
statutory entitlement claim, that does not make it dictum. It is 
normal and proper for courts to provide more than one valid 
rationale in support of the decision that they reach. 
Plaintiffs also allege that the passage in question is dictum 
because it addresses the question of whether the plaintiffs could 
have stated a valid claim directly against the State and DFI, as 
opposed to one based on the ILGC being an alter ego of the State 
and DFI. The factual basis of the claim would be unchanged. This 
Court appropriately recognized that the adequacy of a cause of 
action is to be determined by consideration of the substance of the 
allegations made, rather than by particular legal labels which the 
pleader chooses to affix to them. 
The substance of the pleading and the nature 
of the issues which are raised, rather than 
the pleader's designation of the cause of 
action, control the issue. 
Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Utah 1983). Plaintiffs, by 
this argument, seek a second day in court. They ask this Court to 
strike part of its decision so as to provide plaintiffs an 
opportunity to reargue the very issue again in a separate lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs seek to have two chances for success. They argue that 
this Court's decision that they were not deposit insurers was in 
error, and they also argue that the question should not be before 
this Court but be preserved to be decided in future litigation. 
The question of whether or not the plaintiffs were deposit 
insurers was raised by the parties and presented to this Court. 
Brief of Respondents State of Utah and Department of Financial 
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Institutions at pages 23-24; Reply Brief at pages 2, 11-12. This 
Court properly decided the issue. 
In seeking to show this Court that it erred in holding that 
plaintiffs were not deposit insurers, plaintiffs rely on two 
different statutes. Plaintiffs point out that 12 U.S.C. S 
1823(c)(2)(A) gives the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. (FDIC) the 
power to provide a company acquiring control of an insured 
institution a guarantee which plaintiffs allege is similar or 
identical to the guarantee that the plaintiffs gave to Zion's First 
National Bank. Because the FDIC has this similar authority, 
plaintiffs claim that it shows they were acting as deposit 
insurers. 
Plaintiffs analogy is faulty. 12 U.S.C. S 1823 (c)(1) also 
authorizes the FDIC "to make loans to, to make deposits in, to 
purchase the assets or securities of, to assume the liabilities of, 
or to make contributions to, any insured depository institution. 
..." Under plaintiffs' reasoning anyone making such loans, 
deposits or purchases would also qualify as a deposit insurer. 
Just because the FDIC has certain powers does not make all private 
persons performing similar actions into deposit insurers. 
The second statute upon which plaintiffs rely is that portion 
of Utah Code Ann. S 7-2-15(1)(d) which reads: 
... "Payments," as used in this subsection, 
includes arrangements by a federal deposit 
insurance agency for the assumption or payment 
of the deposit liabilities by another 
institution whose deposits are insured by a 
federal deposit insurance agency. The right 
of any agency of the United States insuring 
deposits or savings obligations to be 
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subrogated to the rights of depositors upon 
payment of their claims may not be less 
extensive than the law of the United States 
provides with respect to subrogation to the 
rights of depositors in national banks. 
Even though the statute is expressly limited in its 
application to federal deposit insurance agencies, plaintiffs seek 
to extend it to claim that their actions in giving a guarantee to 
Zions First National Bank made them deposit insurers. This is 
contrary to the wording of this very statute. The sentence just 
before this in the statute states: 
Any federal deposit insurance agency or other 
deposit insurer is subrogated to all rights of 
the depositors against the institution, its 
officers and directors, and its control 
persons as defined in Section 7-1-103 to the 
extent of all payments made for the benefit of 
the depositors. 
(Emphasis added.) If the legislature had intended that the 
term "payments" (in the sentence upon which plaintiffs rely) 
include acts performed by private parties such as plaintiffs as 
well as federal deposit insurance agencies, the legislature could 
easily have changed the sentence to read: 
"Payments," as used in this subsection, 
includes arrangements by a federal deposit 
insurance agency [or other deposit insurer] 
for the assumption or payment of the deposit 
liabilities by another institution whose 
deposits are insured by a federal deposit 
insurance agency. 
(The emphasized language has been added, it is not in the 
actual statute.) The fact that the legislature did not see fit to 
add these four words to this sentence while using them in the 
previous sentence is an indication that this special provision is 
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only to be applied to federal deposit insurance agencies. 
This reading of the statute is supported by the very next 
sentence in the statute* This next sentence speaks succinctly of 
the special rights of federal deposit insurance agencies, and not 
of the rights that might be granted to "other deposit insurers". 
Defendants State and DFI submit that the challenged ruling of 
this Court was properly reached based on the issues presented to 
this Court in this action. That the challenged decision of this 
Court is correct and should not be striken or changed. 
For these reasons, the State of Utah and its Department of 
Financial Institutions respectfully ask this Court to deny the 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted this of September, 1991. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant State 
of Utah and Department of 
Financial Institutions 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and exact copies of 
the foregoing Response to Petition for Rehearing, postage prepaid, 
to the following counsel of record on this the day of 
September, 1991: 
DENNIS K. POOLE 
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR. 
POOLE & VOROS, P.C. 
4885 South 900 East, #306 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants 
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